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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to answer the question: why do brokers in Pakistan’s capital markets
engage in corrupt behavior? It makes use of theories of moral neutralization and ethical decision
making to understand what rationalizations or justifications individuals come up with to justify or
explain away their corruption. From analyzing what might motivate corruption on an individual
level, this paper then looks at whether deeply embedded norms of corruption exist within
brokerage organizations and across the brokerage industry in Pakistan. These theories are tested
against insights gained from interviews with active market participants in Pakistan. The paper’s
findings are: 1) evidence of partial degree of institutionalized corruption in broker organizations
2) brokers neutralize ethical concerns over their corruption by i) not seeing their actions as illegal
and by ii) questioning the credibility and competence of the Securities and Exchange Commission
of Pakistan as their rightful regulator, and 3) a relationship based culture amongst brokers
motivates corrupt behavior within the industry.

KEYWORDS: Neutralization, rationalization, corruption, Pakistan, brokers
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Pakistan Stock Exchange (‘PSX’) forms an essential component of the Pakistani
capital markets. As of the end of March 2016, there were a total of 560 companies listed on the
PSX with a book value of PKR 1,288.78 billion (USD 12.31 billion), a market capitalization of
PKR 6,915.69 billion (USD 66.03 billion), and a market capitalization to Gross Domestic Product
(‘GDP’) ratio of thirty percent.2 3 This market has experienced three major crises in the last two
decades. Theses crises have been marked by allegations of market abuse, broker and investor
default, and serious mismanagement on the part of the capital market regulator, the Securities and
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (‘SECP’). Market abuses have included various price
manipulation tactics and misuse of trade financing products by broker dealers who serve as
intermediaries to investors. Given that these abuses have taken place frequently, and few, if any
market participants have been held accountable for allegations of misconduct, an important
question arises: why do broker dealers engage in these illegal market activities? This paper,
therefore, tries to understand what possible reasons there might be for brokers engaging in corrupt
behavior. It is important that this question be answered because persistent corrupt behavior inhibits
the growth of a country’s capital market by eroding trust in its institutions, and in the process,
discourages investment. This prevents or inhibits private sector companies from being able to
access much needed capital for their business objectives and households from allocating their
savings to the stock market.
This paper will make use of theories of moral neutralization and ethical decision making,
to understand why brokers would engage in corrupt behavior. Techniques of moral neutralization
are essentially cognitive measures taken by individuals to explain away or justify their corrupt
behavior. In this paper, these techniques of moral neutralization have been situated in a larger
theory about the normalization of corruption in business organizations as purported by Blake E.
Ashforth and Vikas Anand. These scholars argue that there is a multi-faceted and interactive
process through which corruption becomes deeply embedded in organizations. The pillars of
normalization are institutionalization, rationalization (a subset of neutralization), and socialization.
This paper will focus on the former two, to see what, if any, evidence of institutionalization and
rationalization exists in Pakistan, and how this explains the prevalence of market abuse. The other
theory of ethical decision making at the individual level being used is posited by Xiao-Xiao Liu,
George I. Christopoulos, and Ying-yi Hong. They argue that when an individual decides to give a
bribe, the individual considers three interactive decision frames: ethical, economic, and relational.
This paper extends this model to other forms of broker corruption, and attempts to explain how
these decision frames are employed by brokers to justify corrupt acts.
These theories will be tested against insights gained from interviews conducted with active
market participants in Pakistan. These interviews provide a fascinating portrayal of Pakistan’s
capital markets and the respective positions of the PSX and SECP within it. The interview findings
Government of Pakistan Ministry of Finance. “Capital Markets,” in Pakistan Economic Survey
2015-16, 99.
Note: The dollar amounts were calculated using historical US/PKR FX rate from March 31, 2016
of $1=104.7299 rupees
3
Nadeem Naqvi. “Divestment of 40 percent strategic stake in Pakistan Stock Exchange,”
Business Recorder, January 20, 2017, accessed April 25, 2017.
http://epaper.brecorder.com/2017/01/20/13-page/841381-news.html.
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are a unique contribution to the field of research on this industry. The findings of these interviews
resulted in six key tropes about the markets:
1. The SECP’s main functions are to regulate and develop but it can be heavy handed in its
policing of the market without giving due attention to the developmental aspect of its mandate
2. Market participants maintain that the SECP has serious human resource constraints which
handicap its enforcement capabilities
3. A perception exists that the SECP is not entirely independent since it is susceptible to undue
political influence and broker exploitation which could potentially result in the poor
enforcement of rules and regulation
4. The legal system provides inadequate support to the SECP in the fulfillment of its enforcement
responsibilities and the SECP itself does not make full use of its judicial powers to investigate
and prosecute white collar crimes
5. The 2008 crisis was created by global shocks but worsened by poor enforcement by the SECP
which allowed exploitative brokers with vested interests in the market to force a price floor in
their favor
6. SECP regulation is copied from Western countries and does not fit Pakistan’s unique context
These tropes are used throughout the paper to evaluate the theories of neutralization and ethical
decision making employed. While there is no conclusive evidence of deeply embedded norms of
corruption, this paper finds that a partial degree of institutionalized corruption does exist amongst
broker organizations. With respect to techniques of neutralization, this paper finds that market
participants are able to neutralize the questionable nature of their activities by 1) not seeing their
actions as illegal and by 2) questioning the credibility and competence of the SECP as their rightful
regulator. Finally, this paper finds that a brokerage community exists that transacts on a relational
basis, allowing them to engage in corrupt behavior with each other’s help.
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PAKISTAN’S CAPITAL MARKETS
2.1 Capital market structure in Pakistan
Pakistan’s capital markets came into existence shortly after the partition of India in 1947.
The Karachi Stock Exchange (‘KSE’) was incorporated in 1949, starting out with 54 members and
13 listed companies with a paid-up capital of PKR (‘Pakistani Rupee’) 110 million.4 The Lahore
Stock Exchange (‘LSE’) was set up in 1970 to “broaden the base of investment and develop the
capital market in the central and northern zones of the country.”5 6 Later in 1989, the Islamabad

Mohammed Nishat and Asif Saghir. 2003. “The Stock Market and Pakistan Economy - 196487.” Savings and Development 15 (2): 132.
5
Ibid.
6 Bloomberg. 2017. “Company Overview of LSE Financial Services,” accessed April 27, 2017.
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=39435139.
4
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Stock Exchange (‘ISE’) was created. 7 In 2012, the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan
passed the Corporatization, Demutualization, and Integration Act, 2012 (‘Demutualization Act’).
This began the process whereby which the KSE, LSE, and ISE were demutualized and then
integrated to form the Pakistan Stock Exchange by January 2016.8 Demutualization is the process
by which the right to trade on the exchange is separated from the ownership right.9 The goal,
enshrined in the Demutualization Act itself, was to attract a strategic investor that would help
“increase efficiency and improve governance standards,” by divesting ownership from the broker
dealers who previously owned, operated, and traded on the exchange.10 In December 2016, after a
competitive bidding process, a 40% equity stake was awarded to a consortium of Chinese buyers,
which included the Shanghai Stock Exchange.11 In this paper, the vast majority of the discussion
will revolve around the KSE and the PSX, since the KSE has historically experienced the greatest
turnover in Pakistan’s stock markets and is generally regarded as the primary exchange. 12 This
market is served by 342 brokers who act as intermediaries for investors but also trade on their own
behalf.13 The Pakistan Stock Exchange has evolved into a major emerging market exchange, and
the Pakistani capital market is a large, growing, and important sector of the economy.14
The primary regulator for this market is the Securities and Exchange Commission of
Pakistan which was founded on January 1, 1999, as a result of the SECP Act (December 1997).
The SECP is the spiritual successor of the Corporate Law Authority (‘CLA’), which was a
department of the Federal Government’s Ministry of Finance. The CLA had “been administering
Corporate Laws in the country since 1981,” but “lacked autonomy and was a bureaucratic structure
that made it difficult to effectively pursue transparency, disclosure and authenticity of operations
Bloomberg. 2017. “Company Overview of Islamabad Stock Exchange Limited,” accessed April
27, 2017.
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=31249891.
8
“Pakistan Stock Exchange formally launched,” Dawn News, January 11, 2016, accessed April
27, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1232253.
9
“Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012.” The Gazette
of Pakistan, May 9, 2012, accessed April 27, 2017, https://www.secp.gov.pk/document/stockexchanges-corporatization-demutualization-and-integration-act-2012/.
10
Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan, “Annual Report 2016: Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan.” Accessed April 27, 2017. https://www.secp.gov.pk/mediacenter/annual-reports/. 9.
11
Nadeem Naqvi. “Divestment of 40 percent strategic stake in Pakistan Stock Exchange,”
Business Recorder, January 20, 2017, accessed April 25, 2017.
http://epaper.brecorder.com/2017/01/20/13-page/841381-news.html.
12
Javed Iqbal. 2012. “Stock Market in Pakistan: An Overview.” Journal of Emerging Market
Finance 11 (1): 63.
13
Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan, “Annual Report 2016: Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan.” Accessed April 27, 2017. https://www.secp.gov.pk/mediacenter/annual-reports/. 20.
Note: This number is as of June 30, 2016.
14
Narae Kim and Faseeh Mangi. “What’s Next for Asia’s Best-Performing Stock Market?”
BloombergMarkets, October 20, 2016, accessed April 24, 2017.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/what-s-next-for-asia-s-best-performingstock-market.
7
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in the financial sector.”15 In the 1990s Pakistan faced rising external debt and diminishing debt
servicing capacity, which got “international donor agencies, (such as the Asian Development Bank
(‘ADB’) and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’)) in the fiscal and monetary policy making
of the country.”16 The rapid growth of the market during the early 1990s “highlighted the need for
establishment of an independent regulatory body with full operational and administrative
autonomy.” 17 The transition from CLA to SECP occurred through the efforts of the Asian
Development Bank under a Capital Market Development Program created in conjunction with the
government of Pakistan to “strengthen…securities market governance, institutions, regulation, and
supervision” by giving “operational and financial autonomy to SECP in regulating the securities
markets, nonbanking finance companies (‘NBFCs’) and corporate affairs.”18 The SECP is today
the “independent statutory regulatory authority for the superintendence and control of corporate
entities, administration of the corporate laws and the beneficial regulation of the capital market.”19
In its role as securities market regulator, the SECP supervises the primary securities market as well
as the secondary market, and therefore the Pakistan Stock Exchange falls under its jurisdiction.
The SECP is assisted in its supervision of the equity markets, by the PSX which functions as a
self-regulatory organization making it the frontline regulator of the exchange.
The securities market in Pakistan is governed by a “multifaceted legal regime” set up by
parliamentary statutes, government approved rules, SECP made regulations, and SECP approved
Exchange regulations. 20 In terms of infrastructural support of the stock market, the SECP is
supported by the Central Depository Company of Pakistan Limited (‘CDC’) which was established
in 1996 and which manages the Central Depository System, an “electronic book entry system for
recording and transferring securities so that securities do not physically change hands.” 21
Additionally, the National Clearing Company of Pakistan Limited (‘NCCPL’) provides clearing
and settlement services acting as a “central and geographically neutral clearing house for book
entry securities for all three exchanges.”22
2.2 Stock market crises

Junaid Ashraf and Waqar I. Ghani. 2005. “Accounting Development in Pakistan.” The
International Journal of Accounting. 40: 188.
16
Ibid., 187.
17
Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan, “Annual Report 2000: Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan.” Accessed April 27, 2017. https://www.secp.gov.pk/mediacenter/annual-reports/. 6.
18
Operations Evaluation Department, Asian Development Bank. 2005. “Capital Market
Development and Enhancement of the Securities Market in Pakistan.” Accessed April 27, 2017.
http://www.oecd.org/countries/pakistan/36053053.pdf. IV,7.
19
The Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions. 2015. “Country
Review: Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan.,”
accessed August 15, 2016. https://www.secp.gov.pk/investigation-and-reports/concept-paperllp/. 7.
20
IOSCO, “Country Review 2015”, 8.
21
Ibid., 11.
22
Ibid.
15
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Since the inception of the SECP in 1999, Pakistan’s stock market has faced three major
crises: in 2000, 2005, and 2008. These crises have been characterized by settlement issues and
clearing default in leveraged trading products. There have also been repeated allegations of price
manipulation and investor exploitation. Despite evidence of market abuses in these crises, no
market participants have been held accountable. In many cases the SECP and the management of
the three exchanges have intervened during the crises by taking decisions that have allegedly
helped the broker dealer community accused of abuse. To fully understand the nature of Pakistan’s
capital markets it is essential that the possible causes of these crises be analyzed along with events
that transpired during and after. These crises have important implications for the market and
understanding them will provide a sense of how the SECP, its associated regulatory institutions
and broker dealers behave in a crisis environment.
2.2.1 Settlement issues and pump and dump in the KSE (1999-2001)
In May 2000, the Pakistani stock market experienced its first major crisis of the SECP era.
The market fell by 27% from 1921 points on May 1, 2000 to 1399 points on June 9, 2000.23 The
SECP Chairman at the time attributed the crisis to “out of settlement default…as a consequence
of excessive overtrading and weak risk management at the stock exchanges.” 24 At the time,
margining and capital adequacy requirements for brokers were lax and the boards of the stock
exchanges did not have adequate independent “non-broker” professionals as members.25 In its
aftermath a requirement was made that the exchanges would need to have 40% independent nonbroker dealer members and settlement of share transactions was reduced from a week to 3 days
from the date of the transaction. 26 From October to November 2000, the market experienced
another sharp decline, in which speculators took advantage by using “blank sale” tactics according
to the SECP, which they believe caused a further decline in the market.27 Blank selling (also known
as naked shorting) is a primitive form of short selling.28 In short selling, broker A will borrow a
particular security from broker B and sell it, with the expectation that the price will fall. Once the
price falls, broker A will repurchase the security at that price and return it to broker B, profiting
off the difference in price. A blank sale “means a sale by a broker on his proprietary account or on
client’s account when the broker [neither] owns [the] shares,” nor has “confirmed the ability to”
attain it from someone else.29 Their hope is that that they will be able to purchase the security at
sometime within the settlement date, once the price drops, and provide it to their buyer. However,
Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan, “Annual Report 2000: Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan.” Accessed April 27, 2017. https://www.secp.gov.pk/document/annualreport-2000/?wpdmdl=4024. 27.
24
Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan, “Annual Report 2001: Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan.” Accessed April 27, 2017. https://www.secp.gov.pk/document/annualreport-2001/?wpdmdl=4026. 3.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., 13.
28
Investopedia. “Naked shorting.” Accessed April 27, 2017.
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nakedshorting.asp.
29
Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited. “Notice on Solicitation of Public Comments on Proposed
Amendments relating to Short Sale/Blank Sale Framework,” January 27, 2017.
23
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the market instead experienced settlement defaults, forcing the SECP to require brokers to “tender
actual delivery of shares by borrowing stocks,” which meant that blank selling transitioned into
traditional short selling.30
In an analysis of KSE trade level data from 1999 to 2001, Asim I. Khwaja and Atif Mian ,
found that when “brokers trade on their own behalf, they earn annual returns that are 50-90
percentage points higher than those earned by outside investors.” 31 They found compelling
evidence that suggests this was due to a “specific trade-based “pump and dump” price
manipulation scheme.32 A pump and dump scheme starts when “[stock] prices are low [and]
colluding brokers trade among themselves to artificially raise prices and attract naïve positive
feedback investors.” 33 Brokers are able to start pump and dump schemes because they can trade
on their own behalf as principal traders, however they also function as market intermediaries for
retail and institutional investors.34 These positive feedback investors enter the market with the
expectation that prices will continue to rise, allowing them to make a profit, which causes prices
to further rise. The brokers also wait for the prices of their purchased securities to rise to a
profitable level, selling those before the positive feedback investors do, “leaving [them] to suffer
the ensuing price fall.” 35 These brokers can then “potentially start another pump and dump
cycle.”36 Khwaja and Mian consider the argument that the return differential for brokers could just
be because as brokers they are more experienced, and therefore better able to profit from the
market 37 However, after analyzing the data they conclude that there is evidence of price
manipulation in the form of “frequent buying and selling of large numbers of shares in the process
of generating artificial volume price changes.”38 Khwaja and Mian believe that for a pump and
dump scheme to be economically viable, a market participant would need the advantage of limited
transaction costs and access to “real time information about the movement in prices, volumes, and
traders’ expectations.”39 Brokers are therefore likely to engage in such manipulation as having a
brokerage license helps limit prohibitive transaction costs and “allows one to sit in close proximity
to other market players and monitor information in real time.”40 Khwaja and Mian also find that
pump and dump schemes are widespread across the stock market, since “the evidence is indicative
of manipulation of stock prices by collusive brokers,” which allows them to earn “significant

Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan, “Annual Report 2001: Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan.” Accessed April 27, 2017. https://www.secp.gov.pk/document/annualreport-2001/?wpdmdl=4026. 13.
31
Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Atif Mian. 2005. “Unchecked Intermediaries: Price manipulation in an
emerging market.” Journal of Financial Economics,78: 201.
32
Khwaja and Mian, “Unchecked Intermediaries,” 201.
33
Ibid., 205.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid., 226.
37
Ibid., 225.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
30
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manipulation rents.”41 As far as Khwaja and Mian know, no broker at the time their paper was
published had been prosecuted for improper activity.42
2.2.2 Stock market crisis (2005)
The origins of the stock market crisis of 2005 are not dissimilar to what happened in 2000.
Starting in “December 2004, and culminating in mid-March 2005, the KSE saw an unprecedented
rise in the KSE 100 index, increasing by 65% from 6,218 on December 31, 2004 to 10,303 on
March 15, 2005.”43 Subsequently, after March 15, the index experienced a “precipitous fall,” in
the form of a “30 percent correction” as can be seen in the chart below.44 45

46

Graph 1: Karachi Stock Exchange turnover (in billions) measured against stock market index
from January 2004 till March 2005.
The graph above shows that there was a steady increase in the index from early 2004
onwards all the way till March 2005. An independent task force that investigated the crisis,
believes the initial rise in the index was due to “increased liquidity due to higher remittances, a
regime of low interest rates, improved corporate performance, higher oil prices, relatively liberal
availability of COT (carry-over-transaction/badla) financing, initial public offerings (‘IPOs’) of
public sector enterprises market for divestment and flotation of more mutual funds.”47 However,
the sharp rise from December 2004 to March 2005, was accompanied by “exceptionally high
trading volumes” with “an increase in the value traded around PKR 20 billion to a range of PKR

41

Ibid., 236.
Ibid., 212.
43
Akhtar, Justice Saleem, et al. 2005. “Report of the Taskforce: Review of the Stock Market
situation March 2005.” Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. Accessed August 15,
2016. https://www.secp.gov.pk/investigation-and-reports/concept-paper-llp/. 10.
44
Akhtar et al., “2005 Taskforce Report,” 12.
45
International Monetary Fund. 2005. “Pakistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix.”
Accessed March 17, 2017. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05408.pdf. 48.
46
Akhtar et al., “2005 Taskforce Report,” 10.
47
Ibid., 9.
42
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50-100 billion per day.”48 49 The taskforce attributed this to “increased COT financing, arbitrage
between ready and futures markets, statements made by senior functionaries of the government,
brokers and market analysts expressing highly optimistic view of the market index levels.”50 It is
important, at this stage to discuss what exactly badla (translated as “in return”) or COT financing
is, since it has remained a salient feature of the Pakistani capital markets and is a post-trade
financing system unique to South Asia:51
An investor or a broker buys shares with the intention to make a profit but
without committing money directly. This is made possible by the investor
carrying forward his position from one settlement date to another in a speculative
trade with an agreed interest rate called the ‘badla rate’ which is determined by
supply and demand. For example, suppose that an investor purchases X shares
of a firm at price P on a given fate. The trade has to be settled according to T+2
settlement two days later. If at the settlement date the investor does not have
enough money to pay, he can arrange a financiers (such as a bank or broker) to
receive the shares from the seller. At the same time the financier sells those
shares to the investor at a price higher than P. Thus, while the investor
(speculator) enjoys the deferment of payment, the financier earns interest at a
rate considerably higher than the prevailing market interest rate. The badla rates
are higher due to the fact that trading is relatively insecure as the exchange does
not guarantee this transaction and also because of the added uncertainty that
share price in the market may go down. This is essentially a carry forward trade
through a repurchase agreement but is different from futures trade since the
badla rate is considerably higher than the risk-free rate which applies in the case
of futures trading.52
The positive market sentiment was already causing the index to rise, but according to the
SECP taskforce the aggressive provision of badla financing seemingly accelerated its ascent. The
task force believes that the hype created by brokers and government officials “stimulated the
market sentiment, creating unwarranted confidence in the capital markets about the strength and
sustainability of the escalation in the index and of the prices of listed stock.”53 What this meant
was that the difference between ready and futures market far exceeded that which could be a result
in a difference of interest rate. So liquidity holders or badla financiers, began to “purchase in the
ready market with cash and sell in the futures market at the same time at inflated prices, locking
in their profits.” 54 Investors were willing to buy in the futures market because they “enjoyed huge
leverage (being only required to put up 10 percent deposits initially), the mood of the market was
48

Ibid.
Shamim Ahmad Khan. 2015. “Study on the 2008 Stock Market Crisis.” Securities and
Exchange Commission of Pakistan. Accessed February 22, 2017.
https://www.secp.gov.pk/document/stock-market-crisis-2008-2/?wpdmdl=15685. 6.
50
Ibid.
51
IMF, “Pakistan: Selected Issues,” 50.
52
Javed Iqbal. 2012. “Stock Market in Pakistan: An Overview.” Journal of Emerging Market
Finance 11 (1): 66-67. (citation omitted).
53
Akhtar et al., “2005 Taskforce Report,” 10-11.
54
Ibid., 11.
49
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bullish,” and trading profits they anticipated making far exceeded the cost of badla.55 The badla
rates were exorbitant, capped at 17.5 percent in the KSE “but rose in the uncapped LSE to over
100%.”56 The “growing availability of badla financing from lenders who were largely brokers and
institutions added to the buying frenzy in the market, raising stock prices on a daily basis and
further amplifying expectations in the futures market.”57 The badla financiers in many cases “were
the same people who were selling in the futures market, and thus benefitting from the heightened
expectations of price rises in the future.”58 The task force believes that there “was a strong nexus
between lenders and brokers/investors who could influence market sentiment to their own
advantage.”59
The task force also found evidence of wash trades, which are another way of pumping the
market.60 A wash trade “is an illegal stock trading practice whereby an investor simultaneously
buys and sells shares in a company through two different brokers … [which] … enhances the
activity in the stock, giving the impression of active trading without any change in beneficial
ownership, a clear violation of Section 17 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.” 61 In
the data the task force found “large instances of the same client or house account of a broker being
both the buyer and seller” and “analysis shows that that the brokers and their clients largely dealt
with each other in groups or sub groups at both a broker and client level.”62 The brokers were
thought to have covered their tracks using other brokers and by not declaring whether their trades
were on behalf of clients or themselves.63 They were also able to make use of benami (meaning
‘without name’) and group accounts.64 Benami accounts imply “use and benefit by a person other
than the person who is shown as the owner.”65 These were only outlawed with the passage of the
Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act in February 2017.66 Group accounts were used by brokers
to “post shares deposited with them by their investors … [made possible because] such shares were
pooled together and held at the CDC, with insufficient clarity on beneficial interests.”67 Group
accounts were eliminated in April 2005. 68 There was “inter-trading between the top seven
brokers … [i]t is noted that brokers often closed out any balance left from these trades with “offmarket difference trades.”69

55

Ibid.
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid., 13.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid., 8.
64
Ibid.
65
Iftikhar A. Khan, “Senate passes bill to curb benami transactions,” Dawn news, January 18,
2017, accessed April 24, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1309177.
66
Ibid.
67
IMF, “Pakistan: Selected Issues,” 51.
68
Ibid.
69
Akhtar et al., “2005 Taskforce Report,” 13-14.
56

12

On March 4, 2005, “the first signs of a change appeared as Badla providers started to pull
Badla out.”70 The badla financiers who were “mostly brokers and to a lesser extent banks, with
the five largest and ten largest financiers providing about 50 percent and 75 percent of total badla
financing respectively.”71 The badla provided in the market peaked at PKR 40 billion (USD 674
million) in mid-February 2005 “falling to PKR 27 billion (USD 455 million) at end-March.”72
This sharp contraction in liquidity and turnover” caused the index to plunge with six stocks that
made up 60% of the KSE index contributing to a “75% ... fall in the index.” 73Badla providers who
also held large proprietary positions in the market as principal traders, “explained that they stopped
financing because they began to worry about the sustainability of the market rise and the
consequent ability of the Badla borrowers to repay their loans.”74 This seemed contrary to their
original investment thesis where they seemed bullish, since they had been selling in the futures
market. What happened next was immensely suspect. Many of the brokers had sold shares in the
future market, locking in their arbitrage profit, but as prices began to fall (a direct consequence of
a decline in badla financing), the potential of futures market buyers to default began to increase,
putting the realization of these arbitrage profits at risk.75 As a result, the brokers began to lobby
KSE management to design a bailout package for potential defaulters, so that they would be able
to sell their shares and realize their profits. Additionally, the task force believed that some brokers
who were sellers in the futures market did not in fact hold the shares they had promised to sell and
were trying to deliberately depress the prices in the ready market (by pulling out badla financing)
so they could pick them up cheap and then sell in the futures market, in order to maximize their
profits.76 The task force believes that they were able to hide this through the use of group accounts.
Investors who wanted to close their positions by selling off their securities, were unable to do so
because market “circuit-breakers” kicked in. 77 This meant that stock prices would not fall below
a certain level, limiting the ability of investors to sell at prices that were higher than they should
be, because of the circuit breaker. If investors wanted to maintain their positions, they would need
to obtain financing, but since “badla financing was drying up,” it became increasingly difficult to
“roll over their position” till the next settlement period.78
On March 24, 2005, the KSE management and “some large brokers began efforts to design
bail out plans for potential defaulters … possibly aimed at protecting their own interests.”79 The
task force believed that the KSE’s risk management system was adequate in dealing with default,
despite which such an intervention was designed.80 In contravention of the rules, COT financing
was not only extended for an additional time period to buyers in the ready market but also in the
futures market which “enabled the weak buyers of March 2005 Futures Contract to manage their
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settlement obligations due on March 30, 2005.” 81 The task force believes that “this ingenious
arrangement [that] extended COT was designed in violation of normal trading rules, benefiting
some large arbitrage players … the regulators acquiesced to this procedure that circumvented the
rules to benefit some large brokers who were sellers in the futures market.”82 Additionally there
were some stocks (OGDC) for which even badla financiers were unwilling to extend financing,
“so it became necessary to arrange a second and complementary bailout package for OGDC
holders at the expense of public money.” 83 A “consortium of institutions led by National
Investment Trust (“NIT”) … arranged to buy shares of OGDC at Rs.117.50 from a whole range
of sellers, some of whom had acquired these at the closing of the March contract.”84 This meant
that some private investors were saved using public funds.85 The task force implies that the KSE
board was conflicted by the presence of broker dealers who were being protected by the very
intervention they had designed and “that some of the vested interest groups behind the KSE Board
prevailed upon the KSE in informal meetings, of which no minutes or records have been
maintained, to bend Badla rules to raise Badla rates, thereby protecting their interests and
multiplying their returns.”86 They also found that “when the surveillance department [at the SECP]
highlighted alleged serious breaches of rules, the KSE management was powerless to initiate
appropriate action against rule violators mainly because of the conflict of interest at the Board.”87
To this day nobody has been held accountable in any way for the alleged misconduct that took
place.
2.2.3 The global recession and Pakistan’s great stock market crash (2008)
Pakistan faced worsening macro-economic conditions in 2008. Rising oil prices resulted
in a serious current and fiscal account deficit. 88 The Pakistani Rupee began to significantly
depreciate and there were massive levels of foreign capital flight, with foreign portfolio investment
in the stock market falling.89 This occurred amidst a global recession and massive political sea
change in Pakistan where a democratically elected government was taking over from General
Musharraf’s dictatorship. At the time, the new government was also negotiating a new financial
assistance package with the IMF. From May to October 2008, the credit rating agency Moody’s
Investor’s Service downgraded Pakistan from B1 to B3, citing “growing economic imbalances and
political difficulties.”90 In this context, the Pakistani stock markets began to experience a “liquidity
crunch” with capital getting “diverted … to risk free investment avenues like [the government’s]
81
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National Savings Scheme,” investment in which increase three fold by the end of 2008.91 At the
same time the Karachi Stock Exchange Index also began to decline. The KSE fell from an “alltime high level of 15,760 points on April 20, 2008” to “4,782” points shortly after December 14,
2008.92 While it would be difficult to determine what combination of macro-economic stresses,
political uncertainty, and global shocks caused this fall in the market, the events that transpired in
the time the decline occurred are of immense interest.
On June 23, 2008, invoking force majeure [(irresistible compulsion)] of the Exchange’s
risk management regulations, it was decided by the KSE management and SECP Chairman that
“to arrest the declining trend and to ensure stability of the market” a circuit breaker would be
instituted whereby which prices could only fall by as much as one percent instead of the normal
five percent.93 Short selling was also prohibited. The goal was to force the market upwards and
“discourage exit of investors.”94 The old circuit breakers were restored on July 14, 2008, but the
market continued to decline. 95 The return to these original circuit breakers, according to an SECP
mandated investigative task force, “enabled release of selling pressure which had accumulated
during the period of revised circuit breaker limits.” 96 Investors “desperate to stave off further
ruin … appealed to management to put a stop to trading.”97 When the KSE management refused
to consider their demand “the crowds stormed out, tore doors from their hinges and hurled stones
through the windows.”98
Consequently, a number of steps were taken to help investors exit the market including a
special trading session on Saturday August 2, in which buyers and sellers could voluntary buy or
sell shares at the closing price of Friday August 1, 2008.99 But at this time, brokers were also
having difficulty meeting margin requirements. A meeting was held on August 27, 2008 between
members of the KSE and its management in which “members expressed difficulty meeting the
margin requirements of the exchange, the lending banks and financial institutions.”100 A 100 out
of the 103 members urged the board to set a price floor on the market based on the “closing price
of securities as of August 27, 2008.”101 A majority of the board decided to vote in favor of the
price floor, including its five broker dealer members.102 The LSE and ISE also followed suit. The
decision was submitted to the SECP for review where it was then approved. The “stated objective
of the decision to impose the floor was to release the pressure of margin calls and to avoid multiple
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defaults.”103 The other options on the table included letting the market take its due course without
any further intervention or to “temporarily close the market.”104
During the hundred and ten days for which the exchange was closed, off market trading
was also allowed and it was alleged that “brokers allegedly misused client shares by pledging the
shares of their clients with the banks without authorization as well as depositing client shares for
the purposes of meeting margin calls.”105 The SECP filed criminal complaints in 2010 and 2011
against “five brokers guilty of failure to abide by code of conduct, failure to collect margins from
the clients, non-segregation of client’s funds and shares, criminal misappropriation of property and
criminal breach of trust.” 106 Additionally, the KSE and SECP received a large number of
complaints against brokers, “alleging misuse of client shares.”107 The SECP task force charged
with investigating this 2008 crisis, in their 2015 report, state that this misappropriation of shares
can be attributed to the in house badla system. 108 When investors purchase shares through the
badla system, brokers are able to maintain custody of the shares, however no proper record of the
transaction is kept, since no formal reporting system exists. 109 This is “risky for the market
[because it can lead to the] … misuse of client’s assets by the brokers in a distress situation.”110
Brokers would be able to sell off their client’s securities, without informing them, to meet their
own margin financing needs.
On December 25, 2008, it was announced by the NCCPL that they would be facilitating a
deleveraging of the market through a voluntary square up scheme that would offset the positions
of margin financers “to minimize the[ir] [losses] and “protect the financees from possible default
proceedings.”111 This meant that brokers would receive a partial repayment of badla funds they
had provided to investors so as to prevent “mass scale broker default.”112 Ultimately, in the 2015
report on the crisis, the SECP task force reiterated what the Competition Commission of Pakistan
(‘CCP’) (which holds responsibility for dealing with anti-trust issues) had asserted in 2009, that
the decision of the price floor “raises questions of serious conflict on the basis of the vote of five
broker directors who were to personally benefit from the decision for imposition of the floor.”113
However, in the wake of this report, the current SECP Chairman stated that such an ulterior motive
cannot be established and that “we do not want to waste energies on blame game and trying to see
which broker made how much money in the process … best thing to do was to learn and move on
so that things like this do not happen again.”114
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2.3 Understanding implications of past broker dealer abuse
Despite such major crises, and in some cases clear evidence of market manipulation and
abuse, the SECP has not done much in the way of prosecuting those against whom market abuse
is alleged. In fact, Pakistan’s capital markets have never seen anyone go to jail for insider trading
either, since it was only made a criminal offence in 2015. 115 To this day, questions of
accountability remain over what happened in 2000, 2005, and 2008. Badla financing was replaced
with a stricter margin financing system in 2006, despite which as recently as March 2017, there
have seen cases where brokerage institutions are still making illegal use of the in house badla
system for trading in certain securities, that are ineligible for the current margin financing
regime.116 The SECP does publically go after cases of market abuse, but it still begs the question
why do we not see more cases publically highlighted? Why do we not see people go to prison?
And why do market participants engage in such activities in the first place?
This question leads to the broader issue of corruption in emerging economies and what
explains corrupt behavior. While the answer to the aforementioned question will surely be complex
and multifaceted, it is still important to take a step towards making sense of what is going on. For
the development of a robust capital market, it is essential to take steps to increase transparency in
order to increase market depth and liquidity. This can only be beneficial to investors and the real
economy in the long run. This paper looks at why broker dealers engage in different types of illegal
trading activity such as wash trading, pump and dump and the use and abuse of badla financing in
the first place through the lens of moral neutralization and rationalization. These are theories that
explain how people develop ways to justify or explain away their corruption. From a policy stand
point, it is important to understand how these show up in the Pakistani context so that policy
makers in the future can design effective interventions.

3. INSIGHTS FROM MARKET PARTICIPANTS
In order to understand the applicability of moral neutralization, rationalization, and ethical
decision making theories, active market participants were interviewed. From these interviews
emerged salient tropes regarding Pakistan’s capital markets.
3.1 Interviews with market participants
3.1.1 Interview design
A broad questionnaire was used to guide interviews, which were conducted in a conversational
format. The complete questionnaire can be found in the appendix to this paper. Some of the
questions asked were as follows:
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1. What do you think constitutes an effective regulator i.e. what is the benchmark of an
effective regulator?
2. Do you believe the SECP meets those criteria? If yes, how? And if not, why not? What are
some of the SECP’s strengths and weaknesses?
3. Do you think the SECP handled the 2008 stock market crisis well?
4. Does the SECP today do a better job of mitigating systemic risk? i.e. if a crisis like the one
in 2008 was to occur again, would the SECP be better prepared?
5. Under the SECP Act and its recent amendments, do you feel the SECP is provided adequate
legal cover for it to be an autonomous organization?
6. Has the SECP created a regulatory regime that creates an enabling environment for
investors and encourages development?
7. Do you think the criminal and civil justice system provide adequate support to the SECP
in enforcing its rules and regulations?
Respondents would often stray off the topic from the question asked and discuss other facets
of the market they thought interesting. There were times that questions were ignored or time would
run out before the entire list was exhausted. Their assertions were nonetheless valuable in
informing the claims of this paper. The pre-prepared questions were an easy way of bringing the
conversation back on track so that there could be some comparability across the responses of
different interviewees, which would help identify common ideas, beliefs, and themes.
3.1.2 Respondent profile
Respondents included a corporate lawyer specializing in mergers and acquisition and dispute
resolution, a financial sector executive, an individual who is a former member of the Pakistani
Stock Exchange (formerly the Karachi Stock Exchange) as well as another supporting regulatory
institution, a partner at a major accounting firm, and two former members of the capital market
regulatory regime. At this point I would like to provide a disclaimer that I have a personal
connection with my respondents and in one case a pre-existing relationship, through my father
who in his professional life has remained intimately involved in Pakistan’s financial markets both
as a private market participant and member of the SECP. I did not use my father as an interview
subject.

3.1.3 An overview of interview responses
These interviews yielded a multi-faceted portrayal of Pakistan’s capital markets and all the
actors involved. The claims and assertions of the interview participants were not taken on face
value, but made for a good starting point to start an investigation on a narrow topic of interest
related to the SECP and Pakistan’s capital markets. Their responses were also critical in
understanding if the statements of market participants support the theories espoused in this paper
of what could potentially explain corrupt behavior in the Pakistani capital market. From the
interviews emerged salient tropes, including common areas of concern, on which there were both
converging and diverging opinions. The interview findings have been organized into these tropes,
which will be referred to throughout the paper as evidence in the context of the theoretical
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framework that has been adopted to answer the research question: why do market participants
engage in corrupt behavior in the first place?
These tropes were as follows:
1. The SECP’s main functions are to regulate and develop but it can be heavy handed in its
policing of the market without giving due attention to the developmental aspect of its mandate
2. Market participants maintain that the SECP has serious human resource constraints which
handicap its enforcement capabilities
3. A perception exists that the SECP is not entirely independent since it is susceptible to undue
political influence and broker exploitation which could potentially result in the poor
enforcement of rules and regulation
4. The legal system provides inadequate support to the SECP in the fulfillment of its enforcement
responsibilities and the SECP itself does not make full use of its judicial powers to investigate
and prosecute white collar crimes
5. The 2008 crisis was created by global shocks but worsened by poor enforcement by the SECP
which allowed exploitative brokers with vested interests in the market to force a price floor in
their favor
6. SECP regulation is copied from Western countries and does not fit Pakistan’s unique context
3.2 Discussion of salient tropes emerging from the interviews
3.2.1 The SECP’s main functions are to regulate and develop but it can be heavy handed in its
policing of the market without giving due attention to the developmental aspect of its mandate
There was a consensus amongst respondents that they see the SECP as occupying two main
roles: 1) that of regulator and 2) market developer/enabler. In the words of one respondent, “the
SECP should develop capital markets, match savings through potential investment, and ensure that
it is well regulated and the interests of all stakeholders are looked after.” They all felt that this role
as a “champion for the market” must be carefully balanced against its role as a regulator, ensuring
that the markets are “fair, transparent, and have adequate liquidity.” Interestingly enough, this was
a view shared broadly by private sector participants as well as individuals who have occupied
various positions in the capital markets regulatory regime. Some important problems they have
felt the regulator has had to address over time has been that of badla financing, proper disclosure
of material information to the public, and market illiquidity. While dealing with these issues, in
their view, the SECP has gone from little or no regulation since its inception through the Securities
Act of 1997, to having “substantial” and “onerous” overregulation. The SECP has come a long
way in terms of its ability to better regulate the Pakistani capital markets from a time of “rampant
abuse” to “a real tightening of the regulatory environment, market volatility has reduced, the most
blatant form[s] of abuse [such as] pump and dump, pulling of liquidity, … [the] kinds of abuse
that were very common have practically disappeared.” The SECP has improved since the 2008
crash by bringing in “systems that allow it to track what happens in the market, the amount of
disclosure for investors has gone up, as have trading requirements.”
Issues that remain, however, include, a lack of incentives for savings to be directed into
the capital markets, reliance on volatile forms of leverage trading, ill formed margin financing
regime, inadequate provision of liquidity, and failure to develop new and innovative market
instruments. This emphasis on regulation, however, creates a tension with the SECP’s role as a
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market enabler. In the words of one respondent “regulation has to be commensurate with the
development of the economy,” while two other respondents both lamented the absence of a
coherent and clear “roadmap” for the development and implementation of these regulations, to
allow market participants an appropriate time horizon to adjust to changes. The criticism is that
the SECP’s response to issue after issue “has been to clamp down” by behaving like a “policeman”
instead of engaging in constructive reform and development, which leads to the second issue
broached by most respondents: the quality and capability of the SECP’s human resource.
3.2.2 Market participants maintain that the SECP has serious human resource constraints
which handicap its enforcement capabilities
A number of respondents believe that the SECP has poor human resource and this
presumably contributes to its inability to implement better regulations and enforce the market
properly.117 One respondent asked that: “they have plenty of regulation which is not the problem,
[but] do they have adequa[te]…HR capacity to complement the overall governance capacity?” It
seems that other respondents believe that “quality HR and leadership has all been missing.” One
private sector executive argued for the need to have “competitive” salaries and “merit based
advancement in the organization,” to ensure that the best people occupy executive level positions.
Pursuant to the Corporatization, Demutualization, and Integration Act, 2012, the SECP decided to
sell a 40% stake in the demutualized Karachi Stock Exchange (now PSX) to a technical partner.
This was sold to a consortium of Chinese investors in December, 2016. One of the respondents
believes that this is a mistake, that a technical partnership will not bring in better human resource
and solve the Exchange’s problems. They go on to say that the current SECP management is
altogether incompetent, but does not think anything is to be gained from the technical partnership
and the foreign management it might bring.
3.2.3 A perception exists that the SECP is not entirely independent since it is susceptible to
undue political influence and broker exploitation which could potentially result in the poor
enforcement of rules and regulation
Two respondents identify another issue with the SECP’s staff: appointment of individuals
who may be corrupt, incompetent or cronies of the political establishment. One of the respondents
believes that there are three ways by which the regulator can be handicapped by the regulated who
do not want it to “function properly”: 1) “by making the regulatory organization toothless or
disempowering it, either by getting political people to influence it or 2) by removing its authority,
so you make it unable to do what it is supposed to and 3) put people who are not very capable or
honest” in positions of power. This respondent goes on to say that the current SECP leadership
plays to a “political agenda.” This all against the backdrop of a society that does not have “a very
high moral standard” so it makes sense that “regulations [and] laws are not implemented.” The
other respondent brings up the topic of parliamentary oversight and how the top appointments at
the SECP are made. They believe that there needs to be a “parliamentary committee that vets the
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chairman” and holds it accountable. Additionally, the same respondent cites issues with the
makeup of the SECP’s policy board, which includes members of the finance ministry, whom they
believe can “undermine the SECP.”
While nobody stated directly or insinuated in any way that any current member of the SECP
is compromised or that the Federal Government is exerting undue influence, these responses all
raise important questions about what exactly prevents the development and enforcement of good
regulation, management that is honest but incompetent, competent but corrupt, both or is the issue
more complex than that?
3.2.4 The legal system provides inadequate support to the SECP in the fulfillment of its
enforcement responsibilities and the SECP itself does not make full use of its judicial powers to
investigate and prosecute white collar crimes
Another common issue brought up was the inadequate roles the courts play in helping the
SECP fulfill its regulatory responsibilities “which becomes a basic impediment to good
governance” and the lack of white collar crime prosecutions coming out of the capital markets.
There was a general consensus that the judicial system is “poor” and “lethargic,” but fundamental
to the success of the regulator, however it will take many years for it to become mature enough to
play a sophisticated role in the regulatory regime. One respondent states the following:
The regulator over time has tried to overcome and address all these issues, a
lot has happened. The weak link is the court system. It is very under capacity,
the ability to prosecute for white collar crime is backward, our legal structure
is limited and does not cater to it. There is no prosecution of white collar
crime, the test will come when we try to come to the court. Total criminal
complaints filed are 3-4: that area remains extremely weak, even though the
regulator may have an improved legal backing in terms of structure, the
regulator’s human resources quality has gone down—there is new enactment
that give it powers to prosecute and punish. But it is beyond the SECP’s
control to fix the court system.
In addition to this, another respondent states that the SECP’s “primary role is to prosecute
and take action against regulatees, we have not seen enough of that—we have not seen withdrawal
of licenses.” This respondent believes that the SECP is not making effective use of its judicial
powers, as “market abuse investigations” have simply disappeared. These are important to “ensure
there is a level playing field for all stakeholders in the marketplace.” This is a particular sore point
for this respondent as he believes that “market abuse was a very big factor in [the] 2008 [stock
market crisis], which the SECP has simply “glossed over” not mentioning any perpetrators in its
investigative report on the matter. Another respondent admit that “prosecution is not being done
in the right manner.” This leads to the next point brought up in interviews, the 2008 stock market
crisis, which one respondent described as a “watershed” moment in the history of Pakistan’s capital
markets.

3.2.5 The 2008 crisis was created by global shocks but worsened by poor enforcement by the
SECP which allowed exploitative brokers with vested interests in the market to force a price
floor in their favor
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One respondent drew a sharp distinction between the 2005 and 2008 crises (discussed
extensively in section two). For them, “a crisis took place because a lot of people took leveraged
positions but this was not a bubble like that in 2005.” This respondent states that a “run up in oil
prices” and drastic fall in “domestic liquidity” resulting in a liquidity crisis caused stock market
prices to come down forcing margin calls on brokers, suggesting that broker representation on the
KSE board meant that the decision to institute the price floor could be taken in their favor, which
is why “people” talked about the “need for demutualization” at the time. Another respondent
agrees to an extent that global shocks caused a market down turn and that there was “too much”
broker representation, [with] many of them conflicted at that time.” However, exacerbating reasons
included speculation and market abuse in the form “a major pump and dump … [which meant that]
some of the stocks were ramped up and investors were sucked in, which the regulator has not
acknowledged.” There were other forms of abuses such as the “withdrawal of client securities”
during the four month price floor period which the respondent believes the SECP did not try to
intervene. The “inability to spot speculation and market abuse” were the “singular failings” of the
regulator according to this respondent. They further assert that “the market was falling
continuously…there was significant chance that market would default” since margins were not
being collected properly. Eventually there were riots at the KSE and an overpowering broker
representation on the KSE board, in a major conflict of interest, resulted in the price floor being
set. The “prime reason for [the floor] … was to collect margins.” Summing up what the impact of
the crisis was, the same respondent stated “very serious damage was done in those 4 months,
investors lost because someone sold their shares, confidence was shattered, because [they were]
unable to trade for so long, [KSE was] chucked out of [the Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI)] emerging market index, [and] foreigner[s] exited.”
On the topic of broker dealer vested interests, another respondent stated that there are
“monopolies in the capital markets” and “there is exploitation,” and while the stock exchange may
have been demutualized “the same brokers are there who…indirectly or directly control the
exchange.” While referring to the 2008 crisis, one of the SECP members cited “regulatory capture
by the private market” as an issue, stating that the SECP can only be “as effective as the ecosystem
around it allows it to be.”
3.2.6 SECP regulation is copied from Western countries and does not fit Pakistan’s unique
context
A point which the respondents did not discuss in much detail but is nonetheless important, was
that they believe that much of the regulation the SECP writes is transplanted from western
countries without any due consideration for local context. They find this to be problematic as they
believe it hinders the SECP’s ability to develop Pakistan’s markets on the basis of its own unique
context.
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4. NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION AT THE BROKERAGE HOUSE LEVEL
The normalization of corruption refers to how norms of corrupt behavior can become deeply
embedded in business organizations. The goal of this section is to understand, to what extent such
normalization exists among broker dealers in Pakistan through two major explanatory factors:
institutionalization and neutralization. This section also seeks to gain insight through these two
factors as to why individuals in broker dealer organizations would engage in corrupt behavior at
all. These theories will be tested against responses from interview participants as well as the
historical record. This evaluation of the evidence would have important implications, as it would
suggest that deeply embedded norms of corruption exist that are problematic since they erode trust
in the market and its regulating institutions, dis-incentivizing new investment, and as a
consequence preventing the market’s growth.
4.1 The multi-step normalization of corruption in business organizations
The study of moral neutralization in the context of business corruption is devoted to
understanding why, otherwise good and decent people in their work environments engage in
corrupt behavior. The seminal paper on moral neutralization was published in 1957 by Gresham
M. Sykes and David Matza. In trying to explain juvenile delinquent behavior they realized that an
“individual can avoid moral culpability for his criminal action—and thus avoid the negative
sanctions of society—if he can prove that criminal intent was lacking.” 118 Their argument
essentially is that “much of delinquency is based on what is essentially an unrecognized extension
of defenses to crimes, in the form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the
delinquent but not by the legal system or society at large.” 119 These justifications are called
rationalizations and not only do they prevent feelings of guilt in the perpetrator but also make
deviant behavior possible in the first place. 120 The deviant is then able to use techniques of
neutralization (justifications for deviant behavior) and engage in behavior that directly contradicts
the moral norms of society.121
These techniques of neutralization are discussed in the context of the normalization of
corruption in business entities by Blake E. Ashforth and Vikas Anand who look at how “corruption
becomes normalized, that is embedded in the organization such that is more or less taken for
granted and perpetuated,” allowing “upright individuals [to] routinely engage in corruption
without experiencing conflict.”122 They define corruption as the “misuse of authority for personal,
subunit and or organizational gain” and look at “collective corruption” which are “acts that require
cooperation among two or more individuals.”123 Their focus is more on groups engaging in such
behavior inside organizations than across multiple organizations.124 They suggest three pillars on
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the basis of which corruption becomes normalized in such entities: 1) institutionalization, “where
an initial corrupt decision or act becomes embedded in structures and processes and thereby
routinized,” 2) rationalization (a subset of neutralization), “where self-serving ideologies develop
to justify and perhaps even valorize corruption,” and 3) socialization, “where naïve newcomers are
induced to view corruption as permissible, if not desirable.” 125 These pillars are “mutually
reinforcing & interdependent; once established in an organization, the pillars create a situation
where corruption is practiced.”126
4.2 The normalization of corruption through institutionalization
For Ashforth and Anand, the first step towards normalization of corruption is the
institutionalization of that corruption. Institutionalized corruption falls into the broader category
of institutionalized organizational behavior, which they define as “stable, repetitive, and enduring
activities that are enacted by multiple organization members.” 127 The path from the “initial,
idiosyncratic” corrupt act to pervasive corruption throughout the organization occurs in three
stages: 1) the initial corrupt decision or act, 2) embedding corruption in structures and processes
and 3) routinizing corruption.128
4.2.1 Phase 1: the initial corrupt decision or act— price manipulation and investor exploitation
on the KSE
According to Ashforth and Anand, the strongest explanation for the initial act taking place
is that actors, given a “permissive ethical climate” at the firm, will engage in “amoral or immoral
calculation” by analyzing the risks and rewards of a particular act, thus making corruption
“economically rational.” 129 Interview participants in this study agreed, that two of the clearly
defined roles of the SECP are to regulate and to develop the market. In its regulatory role, the
SECP according to one participant has led a “real tightening of the regulatory environment” since
the 2008 crisis and that “the most blatant form[s] of abuse [such as] pump and dump, pulling of
liquidity … [the] kinds of abuse that were very common have practically disappeared.” But the
fact is that these activities do seem to have taken place in the past. Evidence of such collusive
pump and dump activity was uncovered by Khwaja and Mian, and the SECP also alleged misuse
of badla and wash trading during the 2005 crisis. In fact criminal complaints were instituted against
brokers who misused client shares to meet the margin requirements of the in house badla system.
In 2000, the SECP also noticed use of blank sales (which although legal at the time), were abused
as brokers experienced repeated settlement default. It is clear that if a broker dealer was to engage
in such activities, from a rational economic perspective these activities would be profitable as they
are designed to exploit pricing differences. Therefore, it can be said with certainty that the initial
decision to engage in corrupt action has occurred in brokerage houses. Many of the respondents
also believe that the SECP does not prosecute white collar crimes properly, with one participant
stating that “we have not seen withdrawal of licenses” and that “market abuse investigations” have
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simply disappeared. This again implies that abuses have been thought to have taken place in the
past.
Such acts of corruption are made more permissible by the presence of leadership that “reward,
condone, ignore, or otherwise facilitate corruption.”130 Such leadership can authorize corruption,
explicitly or otherwise, leaving the employees compelled to comply since the “habit of
obedience … is so strong and pervasive that most people have a difficult time actively defying
orders they do not condone.”131 Additionally if the leader is charismatic, they can use the fealty of
their employees to enable corrupt activities. 132 Neither the historical record nor the interview
findings would suggest that the leadership of these brokerage firms were directly involved in
compelling their employees to engage in such activities across the board. There was one case in
which Munir Ladha, the owner of Eastern Capital, was directly implicated in misappropriating
client shares by pledging them to banks in order to obtain financing during the 2008 crisis.133 His
name was put on the Exit Control List but he managed to flee the country to Dubai.134 A former
employee of the company accused Ladha of “looting the company’s employees” and the KSE
Head of Operations stated that according to reports Ladha had been involved in looting money for
years.135 In this case the leadership was directly involved in the corrupt behavior, Finally, Ashforth
and Anand state that “organizational structures and processes are often contrived to insulate senior
managers from blame, thereby further encouraging corruption.”136 They explain that in a business
environment that emphasizes performance, engaging in corrupt activities to achieve good
performance is made possible if the firm has “minimal oversight and documentation” of business
activities. 137 This makes it possible for managers to plausibly deny any corrupt act, since the
fundamental set up of the organization facilitates secrecy.138 It is hard to say and would be a matter
of speculation, whether such an environment exists in brokerage firms in Pakistan.
4.2.2 Phase 2: embedding corruption in structures and processes— a deviant sub-culture within
broker organizations in Pakistan
In Phase 2 of the normalization process, Ashforth and Anand assert that once an individual
corrupt act yields a positive outcome, when the same issue comes up again “if solutions are not
readily obvious, answers are sought from the memory because: (1) past decisions and acts are
assumed to have been made for rational reasons; and (2) following a precedent helps legitimate
the decision and act.”139 This creates an easy heuristic that has been validated by past success and
can be used again without the need to give due consideration to any ethical implications around
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the act.140 Therefore ‘if the renewed corrupt practice results in a positive outcome an even stronger
precedent is set for the future ... [where] the organization comes to expect and depend on the
payoffs from corruption.” 141 These heuristics slowly become embedded in the organization’s
culture after repeated usage and “the result is institutionalized corruption: personal behaviors
become impersonal norms, emergent practices become tacit understandings and idiosyncratic acts
become shared procedures.”142
There is limited evidence among interview responses of a precedent having been set for
repeated corrupt activities. While discussing the SECP’s role as a regulator, one respondent has
stated that the worst kind of abuses, including pump and dump, the pulling of liquidity from the
market, have fallen since 2008 as the SECP has tightened regulation. That would suggest that a
previously profitable strategy may have come to have been viewed as costly by broker dealers.
The use and misuse of badla for example has repeatedly occurred over the years and this abuse
has allegedly yielded positive results for brokers in the form of exorbitant arbitrage profits. More
recently, since 2011, with the evolution of the margin financing regimes, the criteria of stocks for
margin eligibility has become stringent. Since all stocks are not eligible for this form of financing,
some brokerage houses still provide badla financing to investors as it can generate extra profits
form stocks not eligible to the legal margin regime.143 This would mean that since badla in its least
regulated form has remained such a popular and deeply embedded practice in brokerage houses, it
continues to be used as an easy way to solve the problem of margin ineligibility for certain stocks,
despite being illegal. If that is the case then it would seem that a precedent to circumvent the
margin financing regime does exist but perhaps not as deeply as Ashforth and Anand contend that
it must in order to become problematic.
As these corrupt practices become embedded in the organization’s behavior, a “deviant culture”
emerges that normalizes future corruption.144 The payoffs that can be obtained from normalized
corrupt activities result in widespread beliefs and values that “rationalize the corrupt practices in
ways that neutralize the stigma of corruption.”145 This culture is at odds with the wider culture of
fairness in society, but because of the “countervailing norms and beliefs” that have been allowed
to develop within the organization, its employees become insulated from societal norms and
beliefs.146 This breeds a climate in which secrecy and “obfuscation [are] the order of the day” and
employees begin to use techniques of neutralization.147 Another interesting facet of this deviant
culture discussed by Ashforth and Anand is how individuals possess an identity repertoire and
select their identity based on the local context, which makes their behavior more permissible.
Ashforth and Anand say that “an individual develops social identities specific to the social domains,
groups and roles—and accompanying subcultures—that he or she occupies (e.g. manager, mother,
parishioner, sports fan).”148 This means that an individual’s moral yardstick at work as compared
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to the outside world may be very different because of the particular identity assumed, and therefore
their actions will accommodate local needs, thus neutralizing any concern of corruption and
favoring their “group[s] at the expense of outsiders.”149 Essentially “localized social identities and
cultures tend to be highly salient.”150 This means that “the individual may bend his or her general
commitment to ethics under the press of local circumstances.”151
When discussing the role of exploitative and conflicted brokers during the 2008 crisis, one
respondent stated that there are “monopolies in the capital markets” and that while the stock
exchange may have been demutualized now “the same brokers are there who…indirectly or
directly control the exchange.” This respondent did not elaborate on the methods whereby which
such control over the exchange might be maintained. If this is indeed true then that would mean
the broker dealers of the PSX operate in an environment where they see themselves as the actual
controllers of the market as opposed to the SECP itself. This would mean that in an environment
in which they see themselves as in charge of the market, neutralizing any concerns of fairness
associated with corrupt activities becomes easy, resulting in the worsening of a deviant sub-culture.
Furthermore, the idea the brokers somehow control the market means that local identities become
all the more easily accessible with considerably less thought for the obligations to society at large.
It is entirely possible that corruption at a firm level may extend to an industry wide level. Such
“industry level corruption is more likely in mature industries, where time and stability facilitate
dissemination.”152 Ashforth and Anand state that “an important factor in industry wide corruption
is that governing bodies that are responsible for, or have the capacity to monitor, industry behavior
may themselves become part of the institutionalized system of corruption.153 We know from the
interview findings that a perception exists that the SECP is not entirely independent since it is
susceptible to undue political influence and broker exploitation. An interview participant claims
that the SECP “plays to a political agenda.” Another respondent states that the fact that the SECP’s
policy board has members from the Ministry of Finance “undermine[s] the SECP” as it leaves it
open to interference by politicians. This same respondent believes that political interference is how
some brokers regulated by the SECP manage to make it “toothless or disempower [it]” to serve
their own end. While referring to broker exploitation during the 2008 crisis, one of the respondents
cited “regulatory capture by the private market” as an issue, stating the SECP can only be “as
effective as the ecosystem around it.” Another respondent stated that the “CDC was being used for
abuse, SECP has responsibility for monitoring CDC activity…this was a very big failure of the
SECP.” They go onto say that “once in this mode, getting out of it became harder, after a while
the government got involved which the brokers loved…and [the] four months, while the floor was
in place, there was no proactive involvement of the SECP to prevent market abuse.” Evidently,
inroads exist whereby which the SECP could become compromised either by political or broker
dealer influence or sheer incompetence (not being able to pick up on market abuses in a timely
fashion). This would mean that the regulator itself becomes part of a wider system of
institutionalized corruption by either getting co-opted by broker dealers or inadvertently if it fails
to provide adequate oversight.
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Ashforth and Anand state that it is entirely possible that agencies responsible for regulating a
given industry may become coopted by the actors in that industry and “develop tacit agreements
to turn a blind eye” especially if a revolving door is in place where the regulator plans on joining
the industry at some point in a private capacity.154 None of the interviewees mentioned a direct
revolving door between the SECP and the private sector. However, the perception persists that the
SECP is under capture by the actors it is meant to regulate and there has been a noticeable
unwillingness on the part of the SECP to prosecute brokers in the wake of major crises in the past,
which could potentially encourage industry wide corruption and so, further its institutionalization.

4.2.3 Phase 3: routinizing corruption—limited evidence among interview responses
In Phase 3 of the institutionalization process, corruption becomes routinized and
habitual.155 Routinizing can “neutralize the salience of corruption in four ways.” 156 The first way
is that corrupt activities becomes such deeply embedded and persistent norms that the organization
stops reviewing and thinking about the ethical implications of these activities.157 The second way
is that the corrupt act gets divided up into different specializations, with responsibility for each
task spread across the entire organization. 158 This means that no one person is aware of the bigger
picture and so people may be performing a task that on the surface seems above board, without
knowing that it is actually part of a bigger corrupt practice. 159 The third way is that once an
individual is in the system there is no getting out since “one is effectively locked in by dense task
connections such that the whole sustains each part; one is swept by the momentum of the
system.” 160 Finally, with deeply embedded norms of corruption, the focus becomes on the
processes involved in the corrupt activity, instead of the goal itself which means that employees
are not too concerned with the corrupt nature of the activity and are habitually performing tasks.161
There is no direct evidence in the interview responses of any of these aspects of routinization.
Gathering such evidence would require intimate discussions with broker dealer employees to
understand if pervading routinization exists. A general comment is that given that there is evidence
of pump and dump schemes, price manipulation, illegal use of badla going back over a decade, it
is not unlikely that such practices or their supporting tasks could have become routinized.
4.3 Normalization of corruption through techniques of neutralization/rationalization
Techniques of neutralization are used by individuals in business organizations to justify their
corruption. This according to Ashforth and Anand is the second pillar of the normalization of
corruption and it focuses more on individual decision making when it comes to the question of
engaging in a corrupt act or not as opposed to how such acts become norms across the entire
154

Ibid. (citation omitted).
Ashforth and Anand, “Normalization of Corruption,” 11.
156
Ibid.
157
Ibid., 12.
158
Ibid.
159
Ibid.
160
Ibid. (citation omitted).
161
Ibid.
155

28

organization. They find that “corrupt individuals tend not to view themselves as corrupt.” 162
“Individuals convicted of white collar crimes tend to acknowledge errant behavior but nonetheless
deny criminal intent and the label of criminal.”163 These individuals may also “continue to value
fairness, honesty and so forth, even as they engage in corruption.”164 Individuals are able to make
use of rationalizations that “these ideologies help distance individuals and groups from the aberrant
moral stance implied by their actions and perhaps even forge “a moral inversion, in which the bad
becomes good.”165 According to Ashforth and Anand, these rationalizations become more “potent
when institutionalized in the collective—when they are a shared resource that all can draw on and
mutually affirm.”166 Within the group “the rationalizations are intended for internal consumption
[so] the issue is not their objective validity but whether the group accepts them as subjectively
valid.” 167 These may sound to outsiders as “patently self-serving attempts to legitimate
questionable acts.”168 The two rationalizations that were evidenced in interview responses were
legality and social weighting.
4.3.1 Legality—brokers take advantage of legal loopholes
The concept of legality means that “actors may excuse corrupt practices on the grounds
that they are not actually illegal.”169 Based on the investigations into all of the crises it is clear that
products like badla have been misused, client securities misappropriated, regulations altered on an
ad hoc basis by exchange management, benami and group accounts used to hide collusive trading
activity. In the discussion of broker exploitation during the 2008 crisis, one interview participant
explicitly mentions how there was a possibility of the market defaulting since
margins were not being collected properly and client securities were also being withdrawn to be
pledged as collateral to banks who had lent the brokers money. While defaulting is not necessarily
illegal, it can still be considered unethical, especially if done deliberately. Brokers took big
positions on the stock market, and it seemed that they knew full well that they did not have the
collateral to meet margin requirements. This seems to have been confirmed by the government
bailout. Their desire to make abnormal profit may have superseded any consideration for ethics or
legality, making it permissible for brokers to engage in such activities.
This rationale could also explain the use of group or benami accounts by broker dealers in
hiding their transactions. While not illegal, these accounts were used to prevent investigators from
tracing the beneficial interest of trading activities. The brokers could feel that they were “simply
taking full advantage of what the law … permitted.”170 This flexible understanding of legality is
similar to the lax enforcement of regulations which could also neutralize concerns about how bad
these acts really are since they do not receive punishment. We know that one of the tropes that
emerged from interviews was that respondents felt the SECP did not enforce its regulations
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properly and did not have support from the legal system. One of the respondents stated that “there
is not prosecution of white collar crime” with limited criminal complaints filed each year. In fact,
in data provided by the SECP tells us that there have been thirty-two enquiries/investigations since
2009 but there were only two criminal complaints in 2007, one in 2011, three in 2013, two in 2015,
and eight in 2017.171 From March 2012 till March 2017, the SECP has fined approximately PKR
55 million to market participants.172 It is plausible that even when known that such activities are
illegal, the participants may be willing to take on fines, knowing that jail time is not a prospect
they need to be concerned about. The SECP itself has shown itself to be lax in holding individuals
accountable for big crises, with the current SECP chairman on record as saying that they do not
wish to attribute blame to broker dealers in the 2008 crisis.
A combination of loopholes in market products, availability of group or benami accounts,
and lax accountability by the SECP could therefore mean that the legality of their actions are not
of great concern for broker dealers. This would mean that concerns of the act being illegal are
neutralized.

4.3.2 Social weighting—the SECP has its fair share of detractors
Social weighting refers to “how much attention and credence one actor gives to the values
and beliefs of another.” 173 One subset of this, which is especially salient to Pakistan, is the
condemning of the condemners “which involves impugning the legitimacy of those who would
cast the act or actor as corrupt.” Ashforth and Anand suggest that “the corrupt may characterize a
disliked law as vague, complex, inconsistent, rarely enforced, punitive or politically motivated
such that enforcement is capricious or malicious.” This would mean that actors may not see their
act as corrupt since they defy the very legitimacy of the laws and enforcers above them.
In the interviews with market participants such an image of the SECP does emerge. One
of the main tropes was that the SECP has two clearly defined roles: regulator and developer with
considerably less attention paid to the latter role. One respondent stated that regulation enforced
by the SECP is “onerous” and burdensome for the growth of the market since it is “badly regulated.”
For them much of the regulation should be “repealed” and replaced with regulation that is
“pragmatic.” Another respondent said that the SECP’s regulations are not “commensurate with the
growth of the economy,” that the SECP behaves like a “policeman.” For this same respondent, the
SECP regulates Pakistan with laws that are meant for mature countries, such as takeover laws, and
that these laws “add substantial amount of timeline on transactions.” They believe that the
application of such laws can be delayed and that the SECP must think of itself “as partner in
development and less as a policeman because [the] engine of growth is the private sector.” Another
respondent stated that the SECP has indeed tightened regulations but they have jolted the system
since this was done in a short period of time without presenting any roadmap to the intermediaries
to prepare. Furthermore, a respondent stated that there should be “clarity of objectives” in what
the SECP is trying to do with the market. In interviews market participants believed that the SECP
does not enforce its regulations properly and that it does not enjoy enough support from legal
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institutions like the courts. The judicial system has been described as “lethargic” and “under
capacity” and the SECP as not having “taken [enough] action” against those who engage in illegal
activities. The SECP as mentioned before, is also thought to be susceptible to political influence.
One mechanism through which this is possible is the presence of members of the Ministry of
Finance on the SECP’s policy board, which one respondent believes can “undermine the SECP”.
Finally, there also exist concerns about how the SECP has serious human resource constraints, that
“quality HR and leadership has all been missing,” which raises doubts about its ability to
effectively govern.
A portrait of a SECP emerges that is not considered entirely credible as a regulator of the
market, with its activities constantly in questions. It is seen as a heavy-handed policeman, unable
to display a well-thought-out vision for market development, at times politically motivated, and in
some ways incompetent due to doubts about its staff. If such an image exists in the mind of the
respondents, then it is absolutely plausible that many broker dealers think the same way, raising
questions about the legitimacy of the SECP and therefore discounting their role as regulator. A
lack of respect for the SECP would serve as a powerful neutralizing force for any actor wishing to
engage in a corrupt activity and is highly problematic for the future of Pakistan’s capital markets.

4.4 Is there sufficient evidence of the normalization of corruption?
It would be a stretch to say that corruption has become deeply normalized across the board
in brokerage houses. However, it would not be wrong to think that elements of this normalization
do exist. It is clear that corrupt activities have taken place in the past and that there has been a
precedent set for activities like pump and dump, misuse of badla etc. as they are immensely
profitable. In that sense, such activities would seem to exist on an institutional level, where it is
not only one trader engaging in them but individuals across the organization as well. We also know
that evidence exists of the use of techniques neutralization by brokers such as legality and social
weighting, and that these can explain why brokers engage in corruption in the first place. However,
it is difficult to claim that these activities are deeply embedded.

5. A DYNAMIC CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING
BROKER DEALER CORRUPTION
5.1 Three decision frames by which individuals view corrupt activities
In “Beyond Black and White: Three Decision Frames of Bribery,” Xiao-Xiao Liu, George
I. Christopoulos & Ying-yi Hong, suggest that an individual can “employ three Decision frames
to [construe a bribe-giving situation]: the ethical (i.e. moral aspects), economic (financial outcomes)
and relational (utility derived from social interactions).”174 The individual attaches weights to each
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of these frames of thinking about the decision and these weights determine choice. 175 These
weights can be influenced by social-psychological factors such as moral and organizational
identity and cultural factors such as institutional environment, cultural values, and social norms.176
It is plausible that these socio-psychological and cultural factors have salience when it comes to
the Pakistan stock market and will be extending this framework to activities such as price
manipulation and insider trading.
The ethical frame is “defined as the perception that the situation involves an ethical
decision, which leads to subsequent ethical judgment—that there is a “right” or “wrong”
dichotomy.” 177 Because engaging in a corrupt action can “violate the rule of fairness,” a
“fundamental principle of morality” and also ostensibly hurt others, framing the decision in this
way would “suppress the intention to give bribes” or engage in price manipulation or insider
trading. 178 However, as discussed in the previous chapter Liu, Christopoulos, and Hong also
believe that this does not always have to be the case, since individuals can morally disengage from
the decision by making “use of cognitive mechanisms to reframe one’s actions to downplay the
ethical aspects” which would make the corrupt decision more permissible. 179 This is not very
different from techniques of neutralization.
The economic frame “sets up a framework where within which bribery is perceived as an
economic transaction.”180 What this essentially means is that decision makers engage in a cost
benefit analysis before making a final call.181 They weigh the costs and benefits in economic terms.
This is a straightforward decision frame which this paper will not devote too much time too as it
come up time and time again in explanations of what motivates corrupt behavior. The relational
frame “indicates the perception that the situation involves concerns for building interpersonal
relationships.” 182 For example, if two parties are exchanging a bribe, then maintaining the
relationship could become a salient concern over the ethical implications of the act since “the act
is no longer considered as bribery but as a social exchange to develop interpersonal
relationships.”183 The question for Liu, Christopoulos, and Hong now becomes how do individuals
weight these different frames and what affects these contexts i.e. socio-psychological and cultural
factors. This section will use the insights uncovered from various investigative reports discussed
in section two and tropes from interviews to see to what extent Liu, Christopoulos, and Hong’s
framework can be used to understand the motivations of market participants in various crises, and
the implications of this moving forward.
5.2 Identity and decision frames—broker dealer networks controlling the exchange

Liu, Christopoulos, and Hong, “Beyond Black and White: Three Decision Frames of
Bribery,” 4.
176
Ibid.
177
Ibid., 6.
178
Ibid., 6-7. (citation omitted).
179
Ibid., 7. (citation omitted).
180
Ibid.
181
Ibid.
182
Ibid., 8.
183
Ibid.
175

32

Liu, Christopoulos, and Hong, assert that an individual’s identity plays an important role
in their decision making process, that “following recognition of a situation,” individual will ask
“how will someone like me react to this type of situation?”184 So it is entirely plausible that an
individual’s organizational identity i.e. “the social classification that individuals derive from their
membership with social groups,” could motivate a broker dealer to engage in price manipulation,
since the organization’s success and failure could be seen as their own. 185 This means that the
economic frame would emerge as salient, neutralizing any ethical concerns of the act. We already
know from respondents when discussing broker exploitation during the 2008 crisis, that pump and
dump and misappropriation of client securities was highly lucrative. Furthermore, such individuals
in broker dealer organizations could also possess unique social identities by which they “classify
themselves based on group memberships” that “inform who they are in their social identity, and
distinguish themselves from outgroups.”186 Liu, Christopoulos, and Hong, propose that “in group
identity could enhance the use of the relational frame as members within the social group are
bonded to form an in group and the interactions within this group are guided by interpersonal
principles such as reciprocity.”187 This could make it permissible to bribe or engage in the kind of
collusion that Khwaja and Mian talk about since these actions are benefiting the in group members.
This they believe is particularly important for the emergence of “dynamic development of bribery
networks.” This could be a plausible explanation for collusive broker dealer networks.
The dynamic constructivist view of culture states that culture is the product of “shared
knowledge networks among a group of people.”188 This implies that whether people view an act
such as a bribe or price manipulation is highly dependent on what their culture dictates, and this
in terms impacts the decision frame they use to evaluate their decision. So calling something a
bribe is “already a perception based on an ethical frame.”189 It could also be seen as “grease money
from an economic frame or gift from the relational frame.”190 These cultures do not simply have
to be national but could also be organizational or communal. 191 So if indeed there has been
evidence of widespread broker dealer collusion, it is entirely plausible that knowledge networks
exist where individuals do not believe acts like price manipulation, the illegitimate use of badla,
insider trading are morally suspect but in fact the means by which business is done. Furthermore,
in respondent discussion on the 2008 crisis that there was a suggestion of a “conflict of interest”
when the decision to institute the price floor was taken since there was an overwhelming broker
dealer representation on the board. Another respondent states that even if the exchange has been
demutualized to wrest control from brokers, there exist “monopolies in the market” and that “the
same brokers are there who…indirectly or directly control the exchange.” Yet another respondent
states that the exchange is subject to “regulatory capture” by the private market. This would
evidence the existence of networks in the market that result in a broker dealer community that
often works together to protect its own interest, which would create an environment where corrupt
activities can be considered normal.
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5.3 The relational frame in relationship-based cultures
It would be fair to say that Pakistan in most spheres of life has a relationship-based culture
as opposed to a rules-based way of getting things done. In “a rules based system, people generally
respect and trust rules and law.” 192 Relationship based cultures “emphasize familism, a value
system centered on family relationship and preferential treatments towards one’s kin.”193 This,
according to Liu, Christopoulos, and Hong “would arguably give rise to corruption and deviance
from universalist rules and merit” where fairness to the public is subordinated by in group loyalty
since “not fulfilling this duty to benefit in group members can be judged as immoral, which my
override the ethical concern of being fair.” 194 Zulfiqar Ali of the University of Karachi has
demonstrated that this already occurs in the political sphere in Pakistan, such that “ethnic loyalties
by taking precedence over the public interest give rise to the ‘moral view of corruption’, which
explains why so many people do not view the use of public office for ethnic gain to be an act of
corruption.”195
If we look at the network of broker dealers, then it is possible that the relationship based
culture that exists where broker dealers have helped each other settle trades and engage in pump
and dump activities in the past. This could have led to a culture where in group loyalties are so
strong that other forms of corrupt practices could also take place, making the relational frame of
ethical decision more salient in the decision-making process. As we know from the previous
section, broker dealers exist as part of a larger community, and in such a setting the relational
frame of decision making could take precedence over the ethical frame, arguable paving the way
for individuals to engage in corrupt activities more easily.

6. CONCLUSION
In almost every report published by the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, the International Monetary Fund, and the task forces established by the SECP,
demutualization was recommended to wrest control of the exchanges away from brokers so that
they could not make use of their networks to engage in illegal activity. It was not until 2016 when
the stock exchange was finally demutualized, and its ownership rights separated from its trading
rights, ensuring that broker dealers could no longer be in charge. Given that demutualization took
such a long time, it is possible that deeply embedded networks of brokers are in place which could
be used to exploit the market in the future and that brokerage organizations could go further down
the path of corruption normalization, especially driven for how long they many of them have been
allowed to persist without any significant sanction by the SECP.
This is extremely dangerous for the Pakistani capital markets as it means that the markets
remain exposed to the potential of abuse in the absence of policies designed to break these
networks and reverse the neutralization techniques many individuals in these brokerage houses
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may have adopted to rationalize their corrupt activities. While we have discussed many of the
tropes in the context of the theories used in this paper, they deserve to be mentioned again, in and
of themselves as they also provide insight into other factors that may be allowing corrupt behavior.
For future research, it is essential that researchers on this topic look at the impact of a weak
court system and human resource constraints within the SECP on the prosecution of white collar
crime. This would help glean important insight into whether those problems create an environment
in which market participants do not fear getting caught or sanctioned too harshly, and therefore
become more willing to engage in corruption. The other issue to look at would be the degree of
political interference in the SECP, and whether or not it really helps brokers or other market
participants place cronies in the SECP and other regulatory organizations. Finally, an interesting
claim was made by one of the respondents that even with demutualization, the brokers still
maintain indirect control of the PSX. This would be a worthy topic to investigate, since if this
claim were true, it would bring into question the benefits of demutualization which has been major
inflection point in the history of Pakistan’s capital markets.
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APPENDIX

Interview questionnaire
1. In your view, what is the role of the SECP?
2. What do you think constitutes an effective securities regulator i.e. what is the benchmark
of an effective regulator?
3. Do you believe that the SECP meets those criteria? If yes, how? And if not, why not?
What are some of the SECP’s strengths and weaknesses?
4. What changes do you think need to be implemented to make it more effective?
5. Do you think the SECP handled the 2008 stock market crisis well? Should the degree of
government intervention that took place i.e. setting of a price floor on the exchange, have
been allowed to happen?
6. Does the SECP today do a better job of mitigating systemic risk? i.e. if a crisis like the
one in 2008 was to occur again, would the SECP be better prepared?
7. Under the SECP Act and its recent amendments, do you feel that the SECP is provided
adequate legal cover for it to be an autonomous organization?
8. Do you think the new amendment to the SECP Act which requires the initiation of a case
against any entity regulated by the SECP to be first referred to the SECP is a step in the
right direction?
9. NCCPL has recently started offering a facility whereby investors can keep their cash with
NCCPL instead of brokers and settle their trades directly from the security / cash
accounts maintained with NCCPL. This eliminates the risk of misappropriation of cash
for investors. Is this another step in the right direction?
10. Has the SECP created a regulatory regime that creates an enabling environment for
investors and encourages development?
11. How does the SECP rank up against other regulators in terms of effectiveness?
12. Do you have a view on how the SECP compares to regulators in other jurisdictions?
13. Do you think the criminal and civil justice system provide adequate support to the SECP
in enforcing its rules and regulations?
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